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## PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: INSIGHTS FROM A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE

*The legitimacy of any legal act is linked to the duty to state reasons, a procedural justice concept that ensures that the exercise of power is never arbitrary. AI systems, highly integrated into state governance, may generate conclusions through statistical patterns that frequently elude human comprehension. The first objective of this research is to analyse the judgment in the case State v. Loomis, specifically focusing on the judicial reasoning in the context of the use of AI systems in the judicial decision-making process. The second objective of this study is to outline the relationship between procedural justice (fairness) and AI systems within the context of the said process. The study employs the doctrinal legal method, with a focus on the analysis of the judicial precedent State v. Loomis alongside the relevant legal literature. The study shows that the judgment in the case State v. Loomis is important for at least two reasons.*

*Firstly, it concerns the procedural rights of an individual. Secondly, what is of even greater importance is that it may be potentially perceived as aimed at achieving a specific normative goal. Indeed, if AI systems used in the judicial decision-making process are based on selective or biased data, substantive fairness is at risk. AI systems are goal-oriented, and so is substantive fairness. It is possible that significant institutional changes, or even the emergence of new professions, will be necessary to align the above-mentioned goals.*

**Keywords:** procedural justice, AI, procedural fairness, substantive fairness, algorithmic arbitrariness, human rights.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The legitimacy of a state's action or inaction is linked to the duty to state reasons, a concept in procedural justice ensuring that the exercise of power is never arbitrary and that every state's official action (or inaction) can be traced to human-understandable legal principles (Fuller, 1978, p. 407). It therefore forms the basis for the principle that everyone has the right to know the reasons behind decisions that affect their freedom, property,

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or status. As public authorities increasingly rely on AI systems for decision-making processes, trust in both the law and the judicial practice may be declining, especially given the so-called black-box phenomenon.

The main research problem of this study is to determine whether a state's actions (or inactions) may be considered legitimate, and, if so, to what extent, when the state leaves the determination of rights and freedoms to uninterpretable machinery. The study explores a situation in which a public authority's decision is (or appears to be) based on statistical links that elude human comprehension.

To answer the above-mentioned question, two important concepts shall be defined. The first concept to be defined is the black-box phenomenon. A black-box system "is a system that can be viewed in terms of its input and output data, without any knowledge of its internal workings" (Kobiałka, 2025, p. 58). The second concept to be defined is the public order. Traditionally, the concept of public order is perceived as "the conditions that assure the normal and harmonious functioning of institutions based on a coherent system of values and principles" (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1985, para. 64). The maintenance of public order rests primarily with the state, which fulfils this duty through the powers vested in it.

This research is based on the hypothesis that the integration of AI systems into the judiciary threatens to prioritise substantive outcomes over procedural fairness. Furthermore, it posits that without sufficient judicial AI literacy, the state may be unable to maintain the human-understandable legal principles essential for procedural justice.

The methodology employed in this study is the doctrinal legal method. The research focuses on an analysis of the judicial precedent *State v. Loomis* alongside the relevant legal literature.

It is to be noted that this study focuses on the practical implementation of the duty to state reasons, specifically within the context of the judgment under discussion. Consequently, theoretical assumptions are only outlined.

## 2. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

The concept of natural justice is derived from the common law system, where it was developed through the case law of courts and tribunals. As Craig noted: "By the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century it was commonplace for case law to be framed in terms of the right to a hearing being applicable in all instances where there was some judicial, or quasi-judicial form of decision-making, and these terms were broadly construed" (2022, p. 7). The earliest case in which procedural limitations were "imposed" on an administrative authority was *Capel v. Child* (1832). In this case, a statute provided that upon certain conditions (without going into detail), a bishop may order the vicar of a parish to nominate an assistant, in default of which the bishop may appoint the assistant himself. The bishop appointed an assistant without giving the vicar a hearing. The vicar then brought an action against the assistant. The court ruled in favour of the vicar, holding that a hearing should have been given to him. It is acknowledged that the court engaged in a little "spurious legislation" (Tennant, 1928, p. 500).

Undoubtedly, the concept of natural justice is closely linked to the concept of procedural justice, or put differently, procedural fairness (Rawls, 1999, p. 11). The approach to

procedural justice, however, may vary significantly across different legal regions. In general, the legitimacy of the U.S. legal system is premised on its constitutional roots, which guarantee due process of law (Hollander-Blumoff, 2011, p. 177).

Hollander-Blumoff argued that procedural justice and procedural due process have conceptual overlaps (2011, p. 142). Firstly, both concepts emphasise the meaningful nature of participation in legal proceedings (Hollander-Blumoff, 2011, p. 142). Secondly, procedural justice and procedural due process share a focus on the importance of an impartial decisionmaker whose decisions are grounded in substantive rules rather than personal biases (Hollander-Blumoff, 2011, p. 142).

Hollander-Blumoff, however, claimed that where procedural due process elevates concerns about voice, neutrality, and trustworthiness to a constitutional level, procedural justice merely assesses the degree to which individuals feel those standards are met (2011, p. 130). Indeed, some recent studies emphasise the role of the opportunity to express oneself (freely) and to be heard, and the perception of the right to (procedural) due process. It is noted that people who can take advantage of this opportunity, rather than simply being questioned, have a better perception of their right to due process (Meers *et al.*, 2025, p. 110). However, it is rightly pointed out that the opportunity to express oneself freely may best serve those who are capable of better articulating their expectations (Meers *et al.*, 2025, p. 110). There is certainly a space for civic education. The education should address not only the rights of the individual, but also the manner in which they are exercised.

In the U.S., there are two Due Process Clauses in the Constitution. The first is in the Fifth Amendment: “No person [...] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (U.S. Constitution, 1791). The Supreme Court incorporated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution against the states *via* the Fourteenth Amendment (Freeman, 2016, p. 77). The Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall [...] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (U.S. Constitution, 1791).

Crema & Solum argued that, originally, Due Process “meant writs” and was closely related to questions of jurisdiction, presence, and notice (2022, p. 484). These authors also argued that the Due Process Clause has two contemporary meanings: (1) legal procedures that are fair (procedurally just); (2) procedures that are required and/or permitted by positive law (Crema & Solum, 2022, p. 450). In the context of the substantive Due Process Clause, it is argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law must be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose (Nelson, 2005).

Traditionally, the concept of substantive justice (fairness) has tended to provoke greater controversy. According to Mullan, “the adoption of fairness or natural justice as substantive standards of judicial review, far from advancing the prospects for a sound policy-based, well-articulated law of judicial review, will in fact lead to less precise language and thought and inevitably to inappropriate increases in the scope of judicial review” (1982, p. 298; Kotowski, 2026, p. 34 *et seq.*).

In Europe (at the European level), the concept of a fair hearing is derived from Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, Article 6), and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter

of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012, Article 47). In the Convention, the key principle governing the application of Article 6 is fairness (*Gregačević v. Croatia*, 2012, para. 49). “The ‘fairness’ required by Article 6 § 1 is not ‘substantive’ fairness (a concept which is part-legal, part-ethical and can only be applied by the trial court), but ‘procedural’ fairness (European Court of Human Rights, 2013, p. 39). In criminal cases, Article 6 guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in a criminal trial. This includes, *inter alia*, not only his or her right to be present, but also to hear and follow the proceedings” (European Court of Human Rights, 2024, p. 34). Article 47 of the Charter states that “[e]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented” (CRF, 2012, Article 47). In the context of Article 47 of the Charter, Gentile noted that substantive and procedural fairness may be found. Substantive fairness guarantees that “the overall impact of policies is democratically sound, i.e. acceptable to the community of reference and with a general benefit for the citizens” while procedural fairness “is concerned with ensuring the effective participation of entities in decision-making processes” (Gentile, 2020, p. 22). The right to an effective remedy is also addressed in Article 13 of the Convention. The multifaceted nature of the concept of the right to a fair trial in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is emphasised (Gutman, 2019, p. 884 *et seq.*). On the one hand, there is the Court’s attempt to define the very “essence” of the right enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (Gutman, 2019, p. 903). On the other hand, the key challenge remains the further clarification of the relationship between this right and the general principle of EU law effectiveness, ensuring that the protection of the individual is not merely theoretical but practical and effective (Gutman, 2019, p. 903).

In closing this part, it may be claimed that procedural rules answer the question “how” the proceedings should be: how those rules should posit a judge and an individual within and based on law. It is to ensure that the individual remains a subject of the proceedings rather than a mere object of the legal “machinery”. Substantive rules are rather connected with the question “what” normative goal a judgment or decision should effectuate (Naudts & Vedder, 2025, p. 80).

### 3. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN OVERVIEW

It is common knowledge that AI systems are increasingly integrated into many domains of private and professional life, including judicial systems worldwide. The discussion of that process usually takes place within the paradigm of benefits and risks. Regarding benefits, the opportunity to enhance access to justice, improve case management, and support judicial decision-making can be pointed out. Regarding risks, algorithmic bias and the black-box phenomenon may be mentioned. However, a crucial yet often overlooked dimension is the role of judicial self-governance in this digital transformation. This raises the question of the extent to which judges are given a meaningful say in the design and implementation of AI systems.

Rocha & Carvalho pointed out eight main uses or possible uses of AI in the judicial system (2022, pp. 2–3): 1. Similar cases “push systems” (they are designed to automatically

“push” similar cases to help judges and staff reflect on specific cases); 2. Litigation risk assessment systems (based on judicial statistics and analysis of similar cases; they provide basic information that could evaluate possible judgment results in advance); 3. Document-assisted generation systems (designed to help judges write judicial documents); 4. Speech-to-text systems (they convert spoken language into written text used in courtroom records or hearings); 5. Risk prediction systems (they are used in the penal system and are supposed to predict risks for violent crime, sexual crimes and recidivism); 6. Chatbots (they answer questions submitted to the judiciary *via* a keyboard or verbally concerning a relevant case, verdicts, laws, how to bring a lawsuit, how to investigate legal rights and how to obtain evidence); 7. Emotion recognition systems (they can identify the speaker’s emotional state); 8. Filtering systems (they organise information according to a defined criterion and take action, such as grouping cases and returning oral locating cases to judges).

It is argued that a particular threat is posed by a situation where judges heedlessly accept a system’s output (Peluso Lopes, 2025, p. 62). The improvement of AI literacy could be considered a solution here. It is worth noting that the ‘human in the loop’ standard remains illusory if the decision-maker (a judge) lacks the necessary tools to critically engage with technology. Therefore, AI literacy is not merely an additional skill, but a prerequisite for ensuring that human oversight is meaningful rather than purely formal. In general, only a technologically competent judge can effectively counterbalance algorithmic outputs, thereby safeguarding the right to a human judge and ensuring that the individual remains a true subject of the legal proceedings. The critical assessment of the outputs and performance of the tools ought to be ensured. However, while remaining within the above-mentioned paradigm of benefits and risks, it is worth noting that AI may also be used in order to help detect and counteract judges’ implicit biases (Peluso Lopes, 2025, p. 63). It is also argued that: “By focusing not only on outcomes but also on the decision-making process itself, procedural justice offers a path toward building systems that enhance the notions of fairness and trust, thus fostering broad societal goals” (Fischman-Afori, 2025).

The recently published UNESCO Guidelines for the use of AI systems in courts and tribunals propose principles and recommendations for adopting, deploying, and using AI tools to support the administration of justice. They include fifteen universally applicable principles that guide the adoption, governance, and oversight of AI in the judiciary: (1) the protection of human rights, (2) proportionality, (3) feasibility of benefits, (4) safety, (5) information security, (6) accuracy and reliability, (7) explainability, (8) auditability, (9) transparency, (10) awareness and informed use, (11) responsibility, (12) accountability and contestability, (13) human oversight and decision-making, (14) human centric and participatory design, and (15) multi stakeholder governance (UNESCO, 2025, pp. 19–20). They are based on a general concept that AI should not be seen as a replacement for judicial reasoning, but as an assistive tool to expand access to information, enhance efficiency, and support equitable justice – always under meaningful human supervision and ethical review (UNESCO, 2025, p. 6). A reference to procedural fairness may be found under the above-mentioned principle of the protection of human rights. It reads as follows: “While all human rights may be potentially affected by certain AI systems along the life cycle of these tools, the following four are particularly important in the context of judicial proceedings: [...] Procedural fairness: Assess the implications of AI systems for procedural

fairness throughout the AI system's life cycle and prevent deployments that breach this right" (UNESCO, 2025, p. 18). Similarly, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) of the Council of Europe, in its 'European Ethical Charter on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in judicial systems and their environment', has identified the principle of fairness as a core requirement to be respected in the field of AI and justice (European Ethical Charter on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in judicial systems and their environment, 2018, p. 11). Thus, in light of these standards, procedural fairness may be regarded as an essential human right. The deployment (adoption and use) of AI systems which breach this right should not take place. It is actually a defining characteristic of the contemporary AI regulations that they refer to human rights and fundamental freedoms (Strzpek, 2024, p. 74; Kriebitz *et al.*, 2025, p. 24; Ali *et al.*, 2026, p. 1414).

#### **4. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: STATE V. LOOMIS**

In 2007, the Conference of Chief Justices in the U.S. adopted the resolution "In Support of Sentencing Practices that Promote Public Safety and Reduce Recidivism" (2007).

The resolution emphasised the necessity of adopting sentencing policies and programs "based on the best research evidence of practices shown to be effective in reducing recidivism" (Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators, 2007). The justification for this position was: (1) the pursuit of meeting public expectations, as the public deserves criminal justice systems that promote public safety while making effective use of taxpayer dollars; (2) the aim to lower recidivism rates; (3) ensuring that criminal justice systems work effectively and efficiently to protect the public by reducing recidivism and holding offenders accountable. It was highlighted that the best research evidence has shown that the use of validated "offender risk and need assessment tools" is critical in reducing recidivism (CCJ and COSCA, 2007).

The case *State v. Loomis* (2016) brought into focus the use of algorithmic risk assessment tools in the judicial decision-making process. The facts of the case were largely undisputed. The defendant Eric L. Loomis was the driver in a drive-by shooting. Following his plea, the court ordered a pre-sentence investigation. The resulting report included a risk assessment generated by the so-called COMPAS tool. Loomis challenged the denial of his request for a new sentencing hearing before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. He argued that the court's use of the COMPAS risk assessment tool at sentencing violated his right to due process for three reasons: (1) it violated his right to be sentenced based upon accurate information, partly because COMPAS is proprietary and prevented him from checking its accuracy; (2) it violated his right to receive an individualised sentence; and, (3) as the COMPAS risk scores took gender into account, it violated his due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of gender. COMPAS is a decision-support tool that estimated Loomis's likelihood of recidivism based on his responses to survey questions and his criminal records (*State v. Loomis*, 2016). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held, among others, that: (1) Loomis had the opportunity to verify that the questions and his answers listed on the COMPAS report were accurate; (2) because COMPAS risk scores are based on group data, they identify high-risk groups rather than specific individuals. Consequently, the court must treat these scores with caution, balancing them against all other factors relevant to sentencing

an individual defendant; (3) the use of gender in COMPAS assessments promotes accuracy, which ultimately benefits the justice system and the defendants themselves.

In addition, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin established cautionary instructions regarding COMPAS that should be part of every pre-sentence investigation report: (1) the proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to prevent disclosure of how factors are weighed or how risk scores are determined; (2) based on group data, COMPAS identifies groups of high-risk offenders rather than individuals, and some studies question if scores disproportionately classify minority offenders as high-risk; (3) COMPAS was not designed for sentencing but for use by the Department of Corrections for treatment, supervision, and parole decisions. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin emphasised that risk scores should not determine sentence severity, incarceration, or the offender's suitability for community supervision (*State v. Loomis*, 2016).

## 5. STATE V. LOOMIS AND THE DEBATE OVER “ALGORITHMIC” DUE PROCESS

The ruling in the case *State v. Loomis* sparked a lively debate in the legal scholarship, particularly in the U.S. In a sense, the very fact that there was a vigorous debate may testify to the controversy surrounding the case, and thus to the right to due process. Among the most frequently discussed issues were: (1) data accuracy and overall data quality; (2) the proprietary nature of COMPAS; and (3) policy solutions.

One of the concerns raised in the legal literature was the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's narrow focus on a single data quality characteristic, namely, data accuracy (the correspondence of data to reality) (Washington, 2018, p. 131 *et seq.*). This, however, prompted questions regarding conceptual completeness – whether the data encompasses the entire relevant scope of the reality it is intended to describe. For instance, data reflecting arrest rates does not necessarily correlate with the actual commission of a crime. Another issue raised in the context of data quality was the disproportionality (or “over-representation”) of data concerning specific social groups (O’Leary, 2025, p. 915). Historically, individuals from Black communities and socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods have been subject to higher arrest rates (Morency, 2022, p. 169 *et seq.*). Some authors have observed that AI systems are oriented towards the maximisation of predictive accuracy at any cost, irrespective of potential infringements upon constitutional human rights and liberties, including the principle of non-discrimination (Thomas & Pontón-Núñez, 2022, p. 407).

Another concern raised in the legal literature was the question of the proprietary nature of COMPAS and other algorithmic tools. COMPAS is a decision-support software used by courts in the U.S. It estimates how likely a defendant is to become a recidivist based on his or her response to 137 survey questions and their case file (Bornstein, 2017). COMPAS is a proprietary algorithm, and some authors considered it a threat when an algorithm infiltrates the decision-making functions of the justice system (Wisser, 2019, p. 1831). This is particularly concerning due to the fact that these algorithms are created and controlled by for-profit private companies that refuse to disclose their source code to the public (Wisser, 2019, p. 1831). Moreover, the algorithms are not and cannot be held accountable for their mistakes (Wisser, 2019, p. 1831). In the context of *State v. Loomis*, the fact that

the defendant was denied the right to an explanation regarding the inner workings of COMPAS may be regarded as a violation of his due process rights (Kinchin, 2024, p. 29).

A variety of policy recommendations have been proposed within the legal literature to tackle the aforementioned concerns. For instance, institution-based proposals can be identified within the discourse. Freeman proposed two solutions: (1) the first is to cooperate with Northpointe to transform COMPAS from a proprietary algorithm into an open-source algorithm that defendants can investigate and verify themselves; (2) the second is to arrange an auditing process where an external overseer from outside the company would perform regular validation checks on the system to ensure its accuracy and appropriate use (Freeman, 2016, p. 101). Similarly, Butler proposed the solution of expert advisors organised by a centralised power (2025, p. 457 *et seq.*). The author suggested the existence of advisors who would be delegated by a central agency to assist in processes where evidence from algorithmic tools is presented (Butler, 2025, p. 457 *et seq.*). The agency and its advisors would be subject to strict confidentiality regimes, which would allay the concerns of tech companies regarding the protection of their intellectual property (Butler, 2025, p. 457 *et seq.*). Therefore, only the advisors of the organisation would receive access to the source codes, and not, for example, experts appointed by the parties to the case, who could have potentially dishonest motivations (Butler, 2025, p. 457 *et seq.*). It appears that such a solution could ensure the participation of qualified personnel in the judicial proceedings, which in turn might reduce litigation costs and enhance the overall efficiency of the court's operations.

Another set of recommendations focuses on the proper configuration of legal proceedings. Christian pointed out that a potentially meaningful recommendation may be that a high-risk score generated by an algorithmic tool should not be made available to the judge at the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings without any other external evidence supporting a similar risk assessment (2024, p. 135). According to the author, even a warning attached to such a score, as suggested by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in *State v. Loomis*, does little to correct the judge's bias toward imposing a harsher sentence than the score may have introduced (Christian, 2024, p. 135). It is also argued that the goal of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) regulations is not to achieve ideal, absolute transparency, or the clearest "white box" model, but rather to ensure that all stakeholders perceive the "black boxes" as sufficiently clear. This approach promotes the stable operation of the entire AI system and fosters trust in it (Xi, 2025, p. 482). In the context of this last argument, it could be summarised that the objective is not to create an ideal "white box" model, but rather to establish institutional and procedural guarantees to ensure that due process rights are upheld.

A fundamental question emerging from the study of *State v. Loomis* and the related legal literature is whether potential legal changes should target the judicial proceedings or the algorithmic tools themselves. It appears that the primary objective is to establish procedural safeguards to ensure that judicial decisions rendered with the assistance of algorithmic tools are, quite simply, just. Undoubtedly, the discourse should involve not only judges and court clerks but also representatives of the social and computer sciences (Komoda, 2023, p. 192). It also seems worthwhile to adopt the fundamental principle that no evidence is perfect – regardless of whether it stems from human action or an algorithmic tool – and that the process of judicial decision-making is inherently one of assessment.

The objective is to ensure that, within this process, the parties to proceedings can effectively present their arguments. The objective is not to obtain perfect evidence or flawless algorithmic instruments, but to ensure “perfect” judicial proceedings characterised by, for example, racially neutral judicial decisions. A situation in which neither the parties to the proceedings nor the judge have access to the source code of an algorithmic tool is far from desirable. Such a lack of transparency certainly does not bolster public confidence in the administration of justice; on the contrary, it tends to undermine it. Perhaps, an institutional solution aimed at establishing a fundamentally new profession – a judicial advisor specialised in emerging technologies – could exert a positive influence on public trust in the administration of justice. Such an advisor, granted access to the source code, would be capable of providing a reliable assessment of the algorithmic tool’s performance. Interestingly, this proposition contradicts the common narrative that AI inevitably leads to job displacement, as in this instance, it could actually serve as a catalyst for job creation.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Procedural fairness in the U.S. and the right to a fair trial in Europe (at the European level) serve a similar function in protecting individuals from arbitrary state action (or inaction). The source of procedural fairness in the U.S. is the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (more concise provisions in nature). Simultaneously, both amendments may be regarded as a source of substantive fairness. The source of the right to a fair trial in Europe is Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (more elaborate provisions), and Article 47 of the Charter of the European Union. Article 6 of the Convention is regarded as strictly procedural in scope (not substantive), whereas Article 47 of the Charter may be regarded as multifaceted in nature, that is, not viewed unequivocally.

In essence, procedural rules answer the question “how” the proceedings should be: how those rules posit a judge and an individual within and based on law. It is to ensure that the individual remains a subject of the proceedings rather than a mere object of the legal “machinery”. Substantive rules are rather connected with the question “what” normative goal a judgment or decision should effectuate. The judgment in the case *State v. Loomis* is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it concerns the procedural rights of an individual. Secondly, what is of even greater importance is that it may be potentially perceived as aimed at achieving a specific normative goal. Indeed, if AI systems used in the judicial decision-making process are based on selective or biased data, substantive fairness is at risk; for instance, such systems may lead to racially biased decisions. AI systems are goal-oriented, and so is substantive fairness. Therefore, without sufficient judicial AI literacy, the state may be unable to maintain the human-understandable legal principles essential for procedural justice. Moreover, the sense of whether a “fair” goal has been achieved is relative and depends on our individual perceptual capacities. This latter factor poses a further, additional difficulty in aligning the goals of AI systems with the goals of substantive fairness. It is possible that significant institutional changes, or even the emergence of new professions, will be necessary to align the above-mentioned goals.

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